Lower renewable energy costs and increasing environmental concerns have resulted in companies incorporating renewable energy standards into their corporate sustainability goals. In particular, several companies have announced commitments to procure a specific percentage of their electricity demand from renewable sources, that is, reach a renewable power target by a future date.
navigating the different renewable power procurement options and understanding their benefits and potential disadvantages is practically important. Two dominant renewable energy procurement strategies that corporations use to satisfy their renewable power target include (i) buying power from the utility (i.e., akin to a spot purchase) and supplementing it with renewable energy certificates (RECs) and (ii) entering bilateral contracts known as power purchase agreements (PPAs) to receive power directly from a renewable generator for a predefined number of years. Corporate PPAs and in particular synthetic PPAs (i.e., contracts without physical delivery of power) are becoming increasingly popular around the world, with 1.6 gigawatt of renewable capacity-mostly wind and solar-contracted through corporate PPAs in 2015 in the U.S. alone (McKenzie 2015) .
Power under such a PPA is purchased at a fixed and predetermined price per megawatt hour, called strike price, which helps the firm hedge against the price risk of power and RECs. On the other hand, long-term contracts expose the company to stochastic demand risk, which might result in over procurement.
In this paper, we study how firms can manage the utility and PPA purchase options to reach a renewable target and then sustain this level of renewable procurement in the future. Within the PPA purchase option, companies have flexibility to choose the size and length of the contract. For example, in the period 2010-2016 Google entered into 20 different PPAs with average capacity equal to 130 megawatt and average duration of 20 years (Google 2017). While the problem of energy procurement has been studied in the presence of short-and long-term contracts (Li and Kouvelis 1999, Secomandi and Kekre 2014) , our work is differentiated by the pricing structure of PPAs as well as the presence of a renewable energy target. Our research is also related to the literature on corporate social and environmental responsibility, in that, it also considers modifying a pure financial objective by adding a social/environmental component (Kleindorfer et al. 2005 , Atasu 2016 , Lee and Tang 2017 , but our energy application and methodological approach are new.
We start by comparing two PPA contract structures used in practice in a two-stage setting under a mean-reverting model for the evolution of power prices. The first structure is the standard PPA with a constant strike price, while the second is more recent and requires the strike price to belong to an interval (Frenkil 2014) . We characterize when procurements costs are lower under the interval strike price compared to the fixed strike price, and relate this condition to the skewness in the power price distribution. This result provides some support for the observed use of interval strike price contracts in practice. We then analyze a three-stage model with one-and two-period PPA contracts to understand the impact of contract choice and the effect of demand uncertainty assuming mean-reverting power prices and log-normal demand. We find that the mixing of oneand two-period contracts for procurement depends on demand variability as well as contract and utility price ratios. Moreover, removing demand uncertainty can either increase or decrease the quantity procured using these contracts. The selection of PPA contract lengths and corresponding procurement quantities are thus nontrivial even in our stylized model, which suggests that the analogous choice in a practical multi-period setting is complex.
We formulate a multi-period Markov decision process (MDP) to minimize the expected procurement cost where the company can decide at each stage whether to enter into new PPAs of varying sizes and lengths. The horizon is divided into two parts: a reach period where the renewable target does not have to be fulfilled (but contracts can be signed), and a sustain period where the target must be fulfilled. Computing an optimal policy of this MDP is intractable because its state space has a high-dimensional (endogenous) component corresponding to the pipeline of power inventories from PPA contracts and another high-dimensional (exogenous) component containing the factors driving prices and demand. We overcome this intractability by developing an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) policy based on a dual re-optimization scheme that relies on information relaxations (Brown et al. 2010) . This approach estimates a lower bound by solving dual models in Monte Carlo simulation as done in the literature and, in addition, obtains feasible procurement decisions in a novel manner by averaging the procurement quantities computed by 2 these models along the Monte Carlo samples. An iterative version of this approach can be used to improve upon the one-shot lower bound and procurement policy.
We conduct numerical experiments on realistic instances with PPA contract lengths ranging from 5 to 25 years and a planning horizon of 40 years. Our choice of PPA pricing model is consistent with publicly available software (NREL 2017). We calibrate to data a mean reverting process with monthly seasonality, a Jacobi process, and a geometric Brownian motion for modeling the evolution of the power price, REC price, and demand, respectively. We find that the lower bound and procurement policy computed by our dual reoptimization method is near optimal and outperforms a popular primal reoptimization technique in the literature. These findings bode well for the use of our dual approach to make multi-period procurement decisions that meet and sustain a renewable target in the presence of multiple PPA contracts and utility power purchases.
